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NOTES
Husband and Wife- Consortium'- Right of
Action in Wife for Negligent Injury to
Husband
by James B. Taylor*
P LAINTIFF, Lucia Hitaffer, brought an action for damages
against The Argonne Company, Inc., employer of her husband,
for her loss of consortium due to the injuries received by her
husband through defendant's negligence. Held: A wife has a
good cause of action for loss of consortium due to a negligent in-
jury of her husband. 2
The decision in the principal case is, to the knowledge of the
writer, the only one so holding in the United States. In spite of
the absence of such decisions, all who are faced with this partic-
ular aspect of the law are puzzled. They are puzzled because the
husband is allowed a cause of action for the loss of his wife's
consortium due to a negligent injury; yet, under identically the
same circumstances, the wife is denied a cause of action.
A view of the common law status of the wife as noted in
Sheard v. Oregon Elec. Ry. 3 shows why the courts were then
justified in allowing the husband to recover and denying such a
right to the wife.
* JAMES B. TAYLOR received his B. S. in Business Administration from
Wilberforce University, was inducted into the Army in 1942 and com-
missioned in August 1943. He served in the European Theatre of Operations
and was discharged with the rank of Captain in 1946. He is presently
employed by the Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Compensation as Regis-
tration and Claims Supervisor, and is a second year student at Cleveland-
Marshall.
'Consortium may be defined as being the right each spouse has to the
companionship, affection, society, co-operation and aid of the other spouse
(but does not include right of services of wife in her husband).
'Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F. 2d 811 (D. C. Cir. 1950), (reversing the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia).
'137 Ore. 341, 2 P. 2d 916 (1931). Plaintiff, a widow, brought an action
against defendant for the loss of consortium of her husband whose injury
and subsequent death, she alleged, occurred through the negligence of the
defendant. Plaintiff contended that the MARRIED WomEN's ACT had abrogated
the common law disability of the wife, thus giving her a good cause of
action. Defendant demurred, contending that the pleading did not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Demurrer was sustained by the
Circuit Court and further sustained on appeal to the Supreme Court.
The Court in pointing out that the MARRIED WOMEN'S ACT does not
entirely abrogate the common law status of the wife cites her common law
status:
"In bygone generations when the customs, conduct, and beliefs of the
English people were crystallizing themselves into the rules of human con-
duct . . . known as the common law, a woman was not regarded socially
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Legislative enactment of laws emancipating married women-
commonly called the MARRIED WOMEN'S ACT 4 - tended to remove
many of the common law disabilities. In Ohio an act was passed
in 1877 which for all practical purposes emancipated a wife from
control of her husband. It placed her on an equal footing with
him in respect to their rights and obligations. 5 Under these stat-
utes she may enter into any engagement or transaction with her
husband or any other person, which either might if unmarried.
This being so, it is difficult to understand why the courts deny her
relief when the loss of her husband's consortium is due to a neg-
ligent injury.
Ohio Courts have construed the above statutes as giving a
wife a cause of action for loss of her husband's consortium when
the loss or injury is due to a wilful, malicious or intentional act.6
Defamation of a wife's character causing alienation of her hus-
band's affection and a deprivation of his consortium is also a
basis for relief.7 The action was allowed also where the husband
was driven insane by a third party's threats of violence.8
or civilly the equal of her husband. He had the right to her labor and
services. It was her duty to administer to him in all relations of domestic
life, including the rearing of his children and the maintenance of his house-
hold. Marriage operated as a suspension, for most purposes, of the legal
existence of the wife. In those days husband and wife were regarded as
one-and he was that one. That contemplation of the married woman
created in her various disabilities; her inability to contract; to maintain
an action in her own name, etc. With much truth it has been said that in
those bygone days the relationship between husband and wife was that of a
liege lord and his vassal. Such being the manner in which the law re-
garded husband and wife, it can readily be understood why a husband
could maintain an action for the loss of consortium of his wife without
there being available to the wife a similar action . .
'Ohio General Code Sec. 8002-1 et Seq.
'Shively v. Shively, 54 Ohio L. Abs. 527, 88 N. E. 2d 280 (1948).
'Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N. E. 102, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.)
360 (1911), Ann. Cas. 1913A, 913. Plaintiff, Lillie M. Cooper, sought damages
against defendant, Henry H. Flandermeyer, a pharmacist, for the malidious
and wrongful sales of morphine to her husband, contending that such sales
and subsequent use of the drug rendered her husband incapable of con-
sortium. Held: A good cause of action is stated. Damages will be allowed
for loss of consortium resulting from a malicious or wilful injury.
'Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 621, 32 Am. Rep. 397 (1878). Plaintiff,
Cassander Westlake, sought damages from defendant, Joseph Westlake,
father of her husband, contending that defendant malici(,usly spoke of her
as being an unchaste woman, causing her husband to become alienated
from her, and to despise her and to refuse to live with her. Held: A good
cause of action is stated.
'Clark v. Hill, 69 Mo. App. 541 (1897). Where defendant, with the ability
to do so, threatened to hang plaintiffs husband, causing such fear in the




Where the loss of her husband's consortium is the result of
personal injuries caused by the mere negligence of a third person,
the wife has no cause of action; she did not have such right at
common law and no legislation has been enacted to give her this
rightY Nevertheless, at the same time that this right is denied to
the wife, her husband has a cause of action under identical cir-
cumstances. 10 In such a case, the gist of the action is the loss of
his wife's services, and the right has not been affected by legisla-
tion which has abrogated the common law disabilities of the
wife.1 This anomaly of the law indicates a change.
The reasons for denying a wife a right equivalent to that of
her husband do not seem logical when viewed in the light of
public policy. The most common reason is predicated upon the
finding that no legislation has been enacted to give her this right. 12
In Flandermeyer v. Cooper where the wife's action based on
malice was allowed, the reasoning of the court seems broad
enough to fit situations in which the injury is due to negligence. 13
Nonetheless, the overwhelming weight of authority is contrary
to allowing the wife such a cause of action 14 and would indicate
that the question is a settled one. However, the opposite is
fortunately true. In 1913 an Ohio court (Superior Court of Cin-
'Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N. E. 204 (1915). Plaintiff,
Edna H. Smith, sought damages against the defendant, The Nicholas Bldg.
Co., for injuries received by her husband, Floyd J. Smith, while riding on
an elevator in defendant's office building, such injuries being due to
defendant's negligence. Plaintiff contended that as a result of these negligent
injuries her husband was crippled for life and rendered incapable of
consortium. Held: A wife has no right of action against a person for the
loss of the consortium of her husband caused by personal injuries sustained
by him through the negligence of such person.
"Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., supra note 9.
"Ibid.
"Ibid.
Note 6, supra, at page 337. "A statutory right cannot change except by
action of the law-making power of the state. But it is the boast of the
common law 'Its flexibility permits its ready adaptability to the changing
nature of human affairs,' so that whenever, either by growth or development
of society or by the statutory changes of the legal status of any individual,
he is brought within the principles of the common law, then it will afford
him the same relief that it has theretofore afforded to others coming within
the reasons of its rules. If the wrongs of the wife are the same in principle
as the wrongs of the husband, there is now no reason why the common
law should withhold from her the remedies which it affords the husband."
"Tyler v. Brown-Service Funeral Homes Co., 250 Ala. 295, 34 So. 2d 203
(1948); Notes 21 A. L. R. 1517 (1922); Feneff v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R., 203
Mass. 278, 89 N. E. 436, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1024, 133 Am. St. Rep. 291
(1909); Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N. C. 120, 126 S. E. 307 (1925);
Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N. E. 204 (1915), L. R. A.
1916E, 700 Ann. Cas. 1918D, 206. (A few of the overwhelming majority
of cases so holding.)
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cinnati), permitted the wife to recover where loss of consortium
was due to the negligent injury of the husband. 15 In 1915 without
referring, however, to the Cincinnati Court's decision, the Su-
preme Court of Ohio held that a wife has no cause of action for
loss of consortium due to negligent injury of her husband. 16 A
North Carolina Court in 1921 found for a wife on similar facts 17
but four years later it was overruled.' 8 In 1949 the Court of Ap-
peals of Georgia was equally divided on the question whether or
not a wife should be allowed a cause of action for negligent injury
of her husband.' 9 Judge Felton in his minority opinion said: "We
do not think that any of the reasons advanced by the authorities
for denying a wife such a right of action are valid. These reasons
seem to be: (1) no statute gives the right, (2) the injury is one
for which the husband can sue, and (3) the injury is remote and
consequential as to the wife. Our answer to (1) is that the com-
mon law gives a remedy wherever a right is violated. . . . Our
answer to (2) is that the wrong is not one for which the husband
can sue. A husband can sue for his loss of the consortium of his
wife but not for her loss of his society. Our answer to (3) is
that if the injury is not too remote and consequential when the
husband sues for loss of consortium, it is not so when a wife sues.
The wrong is a direct wrong to the valuable interest of the wife,
whether intentional or not, the damages for which the husband
cannot sue. In these days of increased enlightenment, her rights
should be recognized and enforced."
The farsightedness and wisdom of dissents are seldom wel-
comed at the time that they are advanced. Nevertheless, their
foresight is often justified by eventual recognition as majority
rules of law. With this thought in mind, it is well to consider the
dissenting opinion of Judge Scudder in Landwehr v. Barbas.20
A wife sued for loss of consortium of her husband due to the neg-
ligence of a third person resulting in his emasculation. The dis-
sent was based on the question: "May a wife maintain such an
action? We know she could not at common law, but in recent
1
"Avonia V. Griffen v. Cincinnati Realty Co., et al., 27 Ohio Dec. 585, 15
Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 123 (1913).1
"Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., supra, note 9.
" Hipp v. E. I. DuPont deNernours & Co., 182 N. C. 9, 108 S. E. 318, 18
A. L. R. 873 (1921).
, Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N. C. 120, 126 S. E. 307 (1925).
"McDade v. West, 80 Ga. App. 481, 56 S. E. 2d 299 (1949).
241 App. Div. 769, 270 N. Y. Supp. 534 (1934).
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years the status of the wife has changed materially. At common
law she could not maintain an action for the alienation of her
husband's affections, nor for criminal conversation. Today she
may.21 . . . In the eyes of our law, marriage is a civil contract.
... Shall it be said that one of the parties to the contract, the
wife, may be deprived of its fruits through the tort of a third
person without the redress accorded to the husband? ... We have
recognized the right of the wife to recover compensation for the
loss of her husband's attention, caresses, affection, exclusiveness,
then why not for the loss of her right to motherhood within her
marriage contract? . . .For its loss . . . she is entitled to such
compensation as the law can afford."
The decision in the principal case, Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,
Inc., represents an inroad upon the majority rule. Notwithstand-
ing the overwhelming weight of authority to the contrary,
2 2 it
has been difficult to accept as sound, fair and logical the majority
holdings of these courts.
It is recognized that the decision reached in the principal
case is not binding on the several state courts. It is believed,
however that in the light of public policy the impact of this deci-
sion will manifest itself in the gradual overruling of state cases
holding contrary to its views. Moreover, courts formerly felt
justified in denying relief because there was no precedent on
which to base a decision for relief. They may now use this case
as a basis for allowing the action.
Citing Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584, 23 N. E. 17, 6 L. R. A. 553 (1899);
Oppenheim v. Kridel, 234 N. Y. 156, 140 N. E. 227, 28 A. L. R. 320 (1923).
" See note 14, supra.
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